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The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Influences on Economic Efficiency and Tax Revenues, and Implications for Tax Policy
Iaxes are frequently so much more burdensome to the people than they are beneficial to the sovereign.
-Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations
While research into the elasticity of taxable income (Ell), which measures the responsiveness of reponed taxable income to changes in tax rates, dates back to at least Lindsey (1987) , recognition of its importance as a central parameter for tax policy design did not begin to take hold until the second half of the 19905 1 In fact, a 1998 survey to dete1mine public and labor economists' views on key policy parameters (Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba 1998) included no questions on the ETI2 1 snspect that a 2008 survey would inclnde such questions, just as 1 suspect that a 1998 conference entitled "Tax Policy Lessons from the 1990s" would have no session on the elasticity of taxable income. The two 1998 survey questions most likely to provide some insight int.o the views public economists then held of the ETI asked about the effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and the Omnibus Budget. Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93) on long-run (steady-state) gross domestic product (GDP). For IRA86, a fundamental
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reform that broadened the tax base and substantially lowered marginal tax rates, the median response was that steady-state GDP would rise by 1 percent. However, the interquartile range was large, from 0.20 to 3 percent of GDP For OBRl"93, wbich raised margiml tax rates for primarily upperincome groups, the median response was zero, with an interquartile range from -0.5 to 1 percent of GDP It is noteworthy that half of public economists surveyed thought that raising marginal tax rates for the highestincome groups (in 1993) would not result in decreased steady-state GDP Disagreement among public economists as to the effect of taxes on the economy is embodied by the view> of two former chairmen of the presidents Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) . One former chairman, Ivlartin Feldstein (l995b, 1999) , estimated that the 1993 tax increases substantially increased deadweight loss (DWL) and that repealing the rate increases could actually irurease tax revenue because positive behavioral responses would more than offset the mechanical revenue loss--that is, the loss in tax revenue absent any behavioral respoIL""s. Another former CEA chairman, Joseph Stiglitz (2004) , viewed the 1993 tax increases in a quite different light: "The Gimon experience showed that raising taxes on the rich does not have the adverse effects that the critics claimed" (4). Additionally, Stiglitz is very c:riticaJ of the Bush tax cuts, while Feldstein supports the lower marginal tax rates 3 One could argue that the two former eEA chairmen take such different pOSitions on recent tax policy because of differing political ideologies or party allegiance. However, a more plausible explanation is that they hold very different views of how respoILsive individuaLs are to changes in tax rates. Feldsteins estimates for the effects of repealing OBRA93, for example, rest on an ETl estimate that is toward the high end of the literature-although not implausible 4 Stightz, on the other hand, while not directly speaking to the ITt, believes that behavioral responses to tax rates are small (at least for high-income individuals). if the ETt is very small, then the revenue and efficien(,y implications from repealing OBRA93 would be quite different from those estimated by Feldstein.
Developments in Assessing the Efficiency Implications of Taxation
Economists have long recognized that taxation creates economic inefficiency by distorting the price of leisure relative to that of all other goods in the economy: Even a broad-based Income tax can have substantial efficiency costs, so long as leisure remains untaxed. Harberger (1964) uses this as motivation for comparing the efficiency implications of direct versus indirect taxation and in so doing shmvs how laber supply elasticities can be used to measure the efficiency implications of income taxation. Harbergers analysis won over the profession and led to increased research into labor supply elasticities, which were seen as proxies for the efficiency costs from taxation 5 More than two decades later, lindsey (1987) examined the lOTI, as opposed to the lahar supply elasticity: However, lindsey emphasized the revenue implications of the lOTI and not its efficiency implications.
In addition to producing lOTI estimates, Feldstein (1995b) described the behaviors that could affect taxable income and argued that many of these behaviors were not captured by labor supply elasticities. Thus, it is more accurate to state that. taxation creates economic inefficiency not only by distorting the relative price onabor and leisure, but more broadly by distoning the relative price of goods or activities that are taxed and those that are not taxed, since leisure is not the only untaxed activity: For exampie, in response to taxes, not only work hours but also work effort might cmmge. Compensation can shift from taxed forms to nontaxed lanns. When tax rates are higher, more compensation is paid in tax-exempt fringe benefits instead of wages, and economic activity may shift from jurisdictions with more burdensome taxes to others where taxes are more favorable. Evasion is another response to taxation that confers DWL, but does not imply increased leisure. In response to higher tax rates, people are more likely to understate their incomes and to overstate their deductions. Over the long run, taxes also influence investment decisions, including how much education to pursue and in what occupations to specialize.
Feldstein (1999)6 shows that one parameter, the ETI, can capture this wide array of behavioral responses and can then be used to calculate both the efficiency and revenue implications from a change in tax rates. In fuct, Feldstein shows that the ETI, along with information on marginal tax rates and income, is all that is necessary to calculate changes in both tax revenue and efficiency: 7 In Harbergers (1964) model, labor is the only source of income, all income is taxed when earned, taxahle income thus equals labor income, and the lOTI with respect to the tax rate is the same as the labor supply elasticity--or at least the elasticity of labor earnings, since labor hours and labor earnings may be imperfectly correlated due to factors such as work effortS Feldstein\; model is more complex, recognizing that income comes from many sources and that those sources are taxed differently (or sometimes not taxed at all), 1axpayers can shift income, as well as alter their tax deductions, exclusions, and credits; some of those beha'iors result in income escaping the tax base (going untaxed), while others allow taxpayers to shift when and under what base (for example, indi\idual versus corporate) income is reported and taxed, Taxpayers also have some discretion over what share of their income is reported to the tax authoritIes, In this more realistic setting, taxable income and labor income (and their corresponlling tax elasticities) can differ substantially.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In the next two sections I focus on important developments in ETI research, both empirical and theoretical, over the first decade of the twenty-first century and relate them to important tax issues that the United States will face over the next few years. Next, I examine the two most important Bush tax cuts, the EconomIc Gmw1h and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) and the Jobs Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (jGTRRA), which changed our tax system in many ways, including lowering individual marginal tax rates, The tax changes, however, are not pennanent--that is, lor the most part, the federal tax system will, after 2010, revert to its 2001 state unless additional legislation is enacted. Thus I go on to use a range of ETI estimat.es from the liJerature to show how allo\ving the individual income tax rate cuts to expire might affect economic efficiency and tax revenues. 1 find that, based on 2005 data, returning individual income tax rates to their 2001 levels would raise revenues by $98,6 billion, assuming no behavioral responses 9 At an ETl of 0.2, $15.6 billion of this mechanJcal increase ($12.2 billion from the lederal income tax and $3,4 bmion Irom payToll and state taxes) would be lost due to reductions in taxable income. At an ETl of 0.8, $62.4 billion of the mechanJcal revenUe gain ($488 billion fmm the federal income tax and $13,6 billion from payroll and state taxes) would be lost. The DWL per dollar of additional revenue from the federal income tax is also highly sensitive to the ETI, ranging from $0,18 at an ETI of 0.2 to $1.25 at an ETl of 0, 8, 10 1 also calculate Laffet. curves (which show the relationship between marginal tax ntes and taX revenue) under a range of different ETJ assumptions, THE ELASTICITY Of TAu'(ABLE lNCOME 105 with special attentian focused on the top ta, bracket. There is considerable debate about the degree to which changes to tax rates affect revenues. My analysis is not intended to settle this debate, but rather to show what ETI assumptions are implicitly associated with the different points of view Again, estimates are quite sensitive to the ETl. At an FIT of 0.2, the estimated Laffer tax rate for the top tax bracket is 78 percent; at an En of 1, the estimated Laffer rate is just 41 percent-Dr slightly higher than the current effective marginal tax rate far this group.
Developments in ETl Research since 2000
Slemrod (2002) presents a taxonomy of the ways in which people respond to taxation and the costs associated ""ith this behavior. These can be condensed to four broad areas: 1) Real behmi",; This involves individuals changing their consumption or the amount they work, for example, by moving away from taxed goods or activities toward those that are untaxed or more lightly taxed. It also includes the shifting of income across tax bases or to jurisdictions where tax rates are more favorable. The labor supply elasticity (wltich measures the trade-off betv'Ieen time spent on labor and leisure) captures only a portion of that response, 2) Timing of income receipt. Sammartino and Weiner (1997) show overall patterns of adjusted gross income (AGl) that are consistent \Vith brge transitory shifting at the top of the income distribution surrounding OBRA93. The timing of executive compensation bas also been shown quite responsive to OBRA93 (GooIsbee 2000) . n Changes to the tax treatment of capital gains in 1987, 1997, and 2003 all appear to have had a large short-term influence on realization behavior. (Even the timing of marriages, births, and deaths appears to be influenced by tax considerations.)
3) Circumvention. This includes both illegally (evasion) and legally (avoidance) bypassing the tax system. In the case of evasion, income is concealed or at least not reponed to the tax authorities. (See Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002 and Slemrod 2007.) In the case of avoidance, income is shifted (intertemporally or between sources) so that a taxpayer receives mOlE favorable tax treatment. Diverting income into a tax-deferred retirement account is an example of avoidance. Higher tax rates generally increase the benefits from evasion and avoidance. 12 4) Response to administration and compliance policy. Rigorous enforcement of tax laws and low compliance costs should limit evasion and lead to smaller income responses of reportable ta.'ffible income to tax changes. However, the benefits from such polices must be weighed against the govemment~addItional costs of administering and enforcing the tax system, since these costs also represent a loss to society In contrast, lax enforcement and high compliance costs will tempt ta'\.1'ayers to hide income, and thus result in larger changes in taxable income when rates change. That inlplies that, instead of structural parameters, taxable income elasticities are endogenous and a function of institutions. The time and money that taxpayers spend complying with tax laws and regulations are also a substantial source of deadweight loss (Guyton et a1. 2003) .
Behavioral changes have efficiency implications. To assess them accurately requires that we dilferentiate real behavioral changes that affect resource alloCJ.tion from mere accounting maneuvers that simply re-label income. It requires that we distinguish between the shifting of activity from inside to outside the tax base on the one hand, and the shitting of income from one tax base to a difierent tax base on the other For example, following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which set the tax rate on Snbchapter S income below that on Snbchapter C income, Subchapter S income increased nearly threefold as income was shifted from Snbchapter C corporations to Snbchapter S corporations. That shift of income was simply a transfer from one tax base to another, but since individuals do not report Subchapter C income, only half of the picture was in view: the increase in SubChapter 5 income. Thus, without information on the drop in SUbchapter C income, the relationship between the marginal income tax rates and taxable personal income can have misleading implications for both economic efficiency and tax revenues.
Issues That Complicate Estimation. The primary methodological objective in the empirical literature is to devise a method for separating the response of taxable income to changes in tax rates from responses to the many other factors that also affect taxable income. Ta" changes take place in a changing economic environment, and the changes to that environment affect income growth. Adeqnately controlling for those non-tax-induced trends in taxable income poses a major challenge to estimating elasticities. In addition, a sound methodology must address several other important issues, including mean reversion, tax rate endogeneity, institutional changes (which ofteu coincide vvith changes in the rate structure), and the distinction between transitory (or temporary) and permanent (or longer-tenn) responses. Finally; some behavioral responses involve extemalities or transfers between economic agents which alter how the efficiency implications of the En should be interpreted. Some of the issues that complicate estimation are discussed in more detail below Exogenous Shifts in the IlUome Distribution and Mean Reversion. The distribution of reported income has widened over the past thirty years. That trend accelerated in the 19805, especially at the very top of the distribution. According to Piketty and Saez (2003) , the share of income reported by the top 10 percent of filers rose by more than 40 percent, from 33 percent in 1979 to 46.8 percent in 2006, with nearly two-thirds of that increase accruing to the top 1 percent of taxpayers. 13 The share of income reported by the top one-half of 1 percent more than doubled, the share reported by the top one-tenth of 1 percent nearly tripled, and the share reported by the top onehundredth of 1 percent more than quadrupled. Because people with the highest income pay a disproportionate share of taxe~the top 1 percent pays nearly 39 percent of all federal income taxes-their beha\~or L<; especially impOltant. 14 Not fully accounting for the portion of income growth unrelated to tax policy can result in large biases. for example, the cuts in marginal tax rates in the 1980s were greatest at the top of the income distribution and were thus inversely correlated with the great income gro\\th at the very top of the distribution. The fact that the income growth at the top of the income distribution is jagged (while following a decidedly upward trend) makes controlling for it even more difficult. if the non-taxrelated portion of that income growth is not fully accounted li)r, that trend "ill bias ETl estimates in a positive direction when tax rates fall (and in a negative direction when tax rates rise).
Mean reversion is another issue that complicates estimation. Over a persons lifetime, income often follows a general path with many fluctuations. After a period when income is particularly high or low, it will often revert to a more normal path. That phenomenon is especially pronounced at the tails of the distribution. Those at the extreme right of the income distribution are often not there for long, and will likely have a substantial drop in income (that is unrelated to tax policy). At the other extreme, those in school (or not employed) will often have large increases in income upon entering the workforce. Not accounting for that mean reversion at the tails of the distribution can substantially bias estimated elasticities. More specifically; not fully controlling for mean reversion will erroneously count both non-tax-related increases (by those below their lifetime path) and non-tax-related decreases in taxable income (by those above their lifetime path) as responses to changes in tax rates. Those factors will bias ETI. estimates in opposite directions, depending on whether tax rates are raised or lowered, but there is no reason to believe that the biases will cancel each other out. Partly for that reason, Illilny studies exclude those with very low earnings. Those at the high end cannot be so easily discarded, since they are responsible for a large share of both taxable income and tax revenues.
These issues are even further complicated by the lact that the size of taxable income elasticity appears to vary across the income distribution. That is, estimated ETls are generally larger (sometimes much larger) for higherincome groups. In such cases, Navratil (1995) shows that some of the early differences-in-differences approaches ,,,ill produce biased estimates for each group. Additionally; if the ETI does in fact vary with income, a single overall elasticity will not be applicable when considering the impact of rate changes that target only part of the income distribution or that differ in magnitude across the distribution. it is almost axiomatic that a simple cross-section regression will show a direct relationship hetween tax rates and t",,,able income. Even v<ith longitudinal data, an individuals tax rate rises with taxahle income. In order to isolate the impact of taxes on t.axable income, tax rates shonld be imputed based on an instrumented (or exogenous) measure of taxable income. After instrumenting, the correct relationship between taxable income and the tax rate should be achieved for each iudividual, but that method does not address the cross-sectional correlation between tiLxable income and tax rates. Studies using cross-sectional variation for identification generally must also include differencing methods (which transform the key dependent variable to the change in the tax rate).
Instit'..tlional Fa£tors: Contemporaneous Tax Polky Changes. If institutional
changes to the tax system take effect contemporaneously with rate changes, they could affect reported taxable income, biasing estimated elasticities, or at least complicating the estimntion. In fuct, Slemrod (1996) shows that cl1anges to the underlying tax base may result in substantially different elnstidties before and after a tax change. Most regression techniques yield a weighted average of the two elasticities.
Most elasticity measures also assume policies toward tax evasion and avoidance as given, when in fact those too are choices that polieymakers can change. Recent work emphasizes the role of institutional factors (Slemrod and Kopczuk 2002, Kopczuk 2005) and shows that the elasticity of taxable income is not a structural parameter, but raUler a functiou of the tax system. Taxpayers are more responsive when opportunities to avoid taxes are more prevalent (or less costly). possible influences on responses to taxes include the availability of substitutnbfe forms of compensation (such as the ability of tlrms to use nontaxable fringe benefIts as opposed to taxable compensation) and the expected penalties for evasion.
The definition of taxable income itself may influence results. Changes to the tax system may alter that definItion. Using the concurrent detlnItion lor taxable income (that is, the defInition that was in effect when the income was received) will confound responses to tax rates v;ith statutory changes to the tax base. But even if a consistent measure is chosen, Slemrod (1998) shows that estImates may depend on the definition used and that even a constant-law dellnition can yield biased results. And Heim (2007) shows that taxable income elasticities will be biased if the dellnition of taxable income changes, unless there are cross-price elasticities of zero between goods whose tiLX status changes and those that are always taxable. Permanent, or longer-term, behavioral responses to tax changes are of primary importance; transitory responses are a lesser conceID. For illustration, suppose that in 1986 taxpayers knew that the tax rates were set to faU in 1987. In the short term, some may have delayed the receipt of income from December 1986 to January 1987. That response would not have aflected real economic behavi.or and would not have influenced long-term taxable income. By contrast, a longer-term response like a persistent change in investment or labor market behavior would have affected the allocation of resources and taxable income for years to come. That is not to say that transitory behavior is always small or triviaL For example, capital gains realizations rose by over 96 percent from 1985 to 1986 in anticipation of lessfavorable treatment of capilal gains set to begin in 1987.
Transitory versus Permanent Responses and llUome Shifting.
Separating transitory from permanent responses is often difhcuIt. Measuring changes in taxable income in the year prior to and the years succeeding a tax change will likely yield a combination of permanent and transitory responses. Phase-in periods and taxpayer e.xpectations about future tax legislation also matter. For example, if rate cuts phase in, peopJe not only divert income (on paper) to the future, but also may substitute leisure in the short tenn for work in the future when the rates are fully lowered. In that instance, intertemporal substitution could result in a near-term understatement and a longer-term overstatement of tlte ETL A related issue is the relationship between tax poltcy and long-tenn career and investment decisions. Tax policy can affect investment. in both human and physical capital, which over time can influence taxable income. That long-run response is important in measuring the true response to tax changes, but may not be fully observed for many years following a tax change, leading to an understatement of the En.
Transfers between Economic Agents. Chetty (forthCOming) warns that the large elasticties found for high-income groups may overstate the efficiency implica-THE ELASTICITY OF D\XABLE INCOME III tions of this groups behavior. Cbetty suggests that behavioml responses by upper-income filers are more likely to involve "fiscal extemalities"-Le., behavioml responses may relleet: the shift.ing of economic activity to other agents in the economy, or in some cases sheltering income has ""lemal transfer cosã nd thus implying a difference bel\veen the private and social costs of avoiding taxes. eanull (1998) notes the pOssibility of income shifting between economic agems. For example, a highly paid lawyer may reduce his workload in response to a tax increase targeted at high earners, but his reduction may shift business to Ia,,-yers in lower tax brackets. As an example of transfer costs, Chetty suggests that an executive may be deterred fram taking a larger share of compensation in the lorm of lringe benefits because doing so would require offering more fringe benef.its to other employees in the finu. Another case of transfer costs involves the potential for fines imposed by the IRS. The expected value of these fines represents a cost to a subset of t""'payers. However, this is not a deadweight loss to society as a whole because the cost to those evading taxes is exactly offset by additional revenues "transferred" to the government.
Recent ETI Estimates. As the obstacles to identification have become better recognized, more sophisticated methods and richer datasets have been used to estimate the ETr. A striking result is that ETI estimates, while remaining quite sensitive to a w.ide aITdY of factors, have tended downward from the earliest estimates by Feldstein (1995a) and lindsey (1987) . These first studies reported estimated ills of between I and 3. More recent studies report estimates closer to 0.4, but estimates still range from close to 0 to greater than l. In addition to displaying this sensitivity to specification decisions, estimates have been found to vary across time and across the income distribution. i5 An influential study by Gruber and Saez (2002) examines taxable income responses to the tax cuts of 1981 and 1986 nsing a panel of tax returns for years 1979 through 1990. This approach lays the groundwork for papers by Kopczuk (2005) , Giertz (2006 Giertz ( , 2007 , and Heim (2007, forthcoming) . Gruber and Saez calculate constant-law income lliing 1990 law excluding capital gains and using the National Bureau of Economic Research~'[AXSIM model to estimate federal and state tax rates. They then apply two-stage least squares, regresSing the log of the income growth (over three-year intervals) against the log change in the net-of-tax rate plus year fIxed effects and dummies for marital status. i6 Recognizing the possibility of mean reversion and secular trends in income, they explore two additional specifications, 1) the log of initial period income as an independent variable; and 2) a ten-piece spline of the log of initial period income.
They are most confident in an income-weighted estimated E11 of 0.40 from the model that includes a ten-piece spline based on the natural log of initial pe110d income. The spline allows the functional relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables to vary by dedle. Gruber and Saez's (2002) corresponding elastidty for a broader measure of income is much smaller, 0.12, suggesting that much of the tauble income response comes through deductions, exemptions, and exclusions, rather than changes in labor supply Kopczuk (2005) uses the same panel as Gruber and Saez to estimate the En and to test the hypothesis that the ETl is not a structural parameter, but rather a function of the tax systems structure. Kopczuk models taxable income as a function not just of tax rates, but also of the interaction between tax rates and the size of the ta.x base, which is used as a proxy for the cost of shifting funds outside the tax base. Additionally, Kopczuk treats mean reversion and divergence within the income distribution as separate phenomena by including separate variables to control for them. Kopczuks estimates are extremely sensitive to both sample selection and model specification. However, he does fmd evidence of a relationship between the size of the tax base and the En-faVOring a specification which finds that a one percentage point increase in the tax base lowers the En by 0.79 percent. Giertz (2007) uses a panel of tax returns from 1979 to 2001 (that heavily oversamples high-income filers) in order to estimate taxable income and broad income elasticities. Applying the methods of Gruber and Saez (2002) , he reports an estimated En for the 19805 that is slightly larger than that in Gruher and Saez, but the analogous estimate for the 1990s is less than half as large (0.20). Following Kopczuk (2005) , Giertz includes separate and nonlinear contTols for mean reversion and divergence v>ithin the income disttibution. This explains about one-third of the difference between the estimates for the 19805 and the 1990s, loweting the 19805 estimate to 0.40 and raising the 19905 estimate to 0.26. Additionally, Kopczuk's work implies that changes to the tax base since 1986 could account for a portion of the remaining difference.
Heim (2007) and Giertz (2006) use a variety of approaches to estimate taxable income elasticities for years covering the OBRA90 and OBRA93 tax increases. Heims preferred specification yields estimated ETIs ranging from 0.46 to 0.58 depending on the length of the interval over which income changes are measured. Both papers attempt to comrol for adjacent-year income shifting when measuring behavioral changes over intervals of several years. When measuring behavioral responses from 1991 to 1994, for example, controlling for adjacent-year shifting recognizes that 1991 income may have been influenced by income shiIting between 1990 and 1991 (since tax rates rose in 1990), and that 1994 income may have been influenced by shifting between 1993 and 1994 (since tax rates rose in 1993). Both papers report estimates that are quite sensitive to an array of factors. Helm concludes that the range of estimates reported in the paper often "resulted from small changes in the specification, [and] includes most a priori educated guesses as to what the taxable income elasticity would be ... suggest[ingj that it may never be possible to pin down the tawble income elasticity with any reasouable degree of accuracy" (33).
Heim ( Instead of controlling for mean reversion and divergence in the income distribution by using a function ofbase-year (or lagged) taxable income, they include variables on financial income, proxies for entrepreneurship, and regional and occupational dummies. In addition. they include functions of age and number of children in the family. They repon a population-weighted estimated ETJ of 0.35 (almost identical to their income-weighted estimate). Including taxpayers over age sixty-one lowers their estimate to 0.28. Restricting the sample to those with incomes over 5200,000 raises their EI1 estimate to 1.09.
In another paper looking at recent tax changes. Singleton (2007) focuses on EGTRR"ii provision designed to reduce the marriage penalty. He uses Current Population Survey data linked to Social Security earnings records to examine behavioral responses to this provisi.on, which substantially lowered marginal tax rates (MTRs) for married couples with taxable income ranging from 546,700 to 554,193 (in 2002 dollars) . This prmision did not alter MTRs for single filers or filers with incomes above or below this range. Singleton reports overall estimated elasticities that range from 0.16 to 0.66, with estimates varying by education and other demographics. These estimates are for earned income and not fully taxable income.
Most of the recent empirical ETI research has relied on panel data. An exception is Saez (2004) , who builds on work by Slemrod (996) and Feenberg and Poterba (1993) by using aggregated time-series data spanning 1960 to 2000. Saez uses a consistent deflnition of income (that more closely approximates AGIless capital gains, as opposed to taxable income) and average marginal tax rate_s for different income groups. Saez's study does not focus primarily on a single tax change, but examines the responses to all tax changes over the past four decades.
Regressing the Jog of taxable income against the log of the net-of-tax rate plus a time-trend polynomial results in a statistically insignificant estimated ETI of 0.20. For the top I percent of the taxable income distribution, Saez reports a much larger and statistically significant ETl estimate of 0.50, Corresponding ETI estimates for the bottom 99 percent of the distribution are negative (but not statistically different from 0).
Saez reports estimated E11s that vary greatly over some subsets of the forty years examined. For example, dividing the change in log income between 1981 and 1984 by the change ill logged net-of-tax rates between the same two years yields an estimated ETI of 0.77. The same analysis comparing 1985 to yields an estimated ETI of about O. The variation in ETls over time is consistent ,vith Coolsbee (1999) and Ciertz (2007), who both find very different elasticities when employing identical techniques to diflerent time periods. Saez (2004) also employs a regression framework that uses taxable income shares to estimate ETls for different segments of the taxable income distribution. Special attention is paid to the top 1 percent of filers. For the varions taxable income groups, Saez regresses the log of the group's share of taxable income against the log of the net-ol~tax rate. Without any time trends, that regression yields an estimated En of 1.58 for the top 1 percent. Including both the time trend and square of the time trend yields an estimated ETl of 0.62. Saez expresses confidence in the 0.62 estimate because that regression has an adjusted coefficient of determination of 0.98, and the fitted values do an excellent job of tracking the trend in the share of income reported by the top 1 percent.
Further segmentation of the income distribution shows that, even among the top 1 percent of the distribution, estimated ETIs vary greatly by income. In fact, the same approach that yields 0.62 for the top 1 percent yields an esti.mated ETl of 1.09 for the top 0.01 of 1 percent. For those in the ninetieth to ninety-filth percentiles, the same approach yields a negative (although statistically insignificant) estimated HI.
Applying the ETI for Tax Policy
Saez (2004) presents a method for assessing the revenue and efficiency implications resulting from changes in marginal lax rates. That method is described in this section and applied in the foJlov,ing section. l7 Saez, building on the work of Feldstein (1999) , breaks the change in revenues resnlting from an increase in tax rates on the top tax bracket into a mechanical and beha,·ioral response, such that
Here, z is average taxable income for those in the top rate bracket, Z is the level of taxable income where the top tax rate kicks in, and N is the number of taxpayers in the top bracket. EMTR is the effective marginal tax rate-the smre of an additional dollar of income that is paid to the government-and ETI is the elasticity of tax2ble income. The first part of equation (1), N • t.£'VITR • (z -2:), equals the mechanical response, or the change in tax revenue assuming no bemvioral responses. Thus, if ETI equals 0, there is no bemvioral response, and tax revenue increases linearly with the tax rate. The second piece inside the brackets,
is the smre of the mecmnica1 response that is olIset by changes in bemvior.
If this share is greater than I, it implies a Jaffer response-that is, an increase in the MTR results in a decrease in tax revenue_ Note that the I.affer (or revenue-maximizing) rate equals Note also tmt rearranging equation (1) 
Finally, the behavioral response is also exactly equal to the change in DWL resulting from the tax rate change. 19 The behavioral response from equation (2) encompasses revenue changes from the federal, payroll, and state tax bases combined-even for a tax increase in just the federal ratebemuse the bases overlap. By imputing income at the new tax rates, z', where
one can calculate the overall revenue offset to the individual income tax separately from the overall change in revenues. Thus, when bemvioral responses are accounted for, the change in federal income tax revenue from raising the rate on the top income tax bracket can be expressed such that
Note that total efficiency costs from the tax system, as opposed to the incremental costs of a change in rates, mn be expressed such that which is analogous to the usual Harberger DvVL fOnnula. Other things heing equal, tax increases for upper-income groups will result in greater DWL because these groups face higher EMTRs and hecause the DWl.. increases by the square of the tax rate.
Data and Institutional Background
One of the most significant economic policy initiatives of the Bush administration has been lowering marginal tax rates on ordinary individual income, as wen as rates on capital gains and dividends. In order to gamer enough political support for the tax cuts, the administration agreed to libyTinthine legislation, in which most of the provisions phase in and phase out (or end abruptly) between 2001 and 2011. These tax changes remain a hotly contested issue, in part because they are set to expire after 2010, at which time tax rates \vill revert to their 2001 levels, but also because of America's long-term fiscal outlook: absent substantial changes, government expenditures are projected to exceed revenues at an unprecedented rate. The centerpiece of the Bush tax cuts was the Economic Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2001, which lowered marginal tax rates and expanded allowable credits and deductions. This was followed by the 2003 Jobs Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, which accelerated the marginal rate cuL, from EGTRRA that were not set to fully phase in umil 2006. Additionally, JGTRRA substantially lowered tax rates on capital gains and dividends. Another provision of EGTRRA reduced the marriage penalty by expanding the size of the 15 percent tax hracket for married filers only20 Table 5 -1 shows the marginal tax rate schedules (for the individual income tax) hefore EGTRRA and alter JGTRRA. For those at the 28 percent statutory rate and above, marginal income tax rates are scheduled to rise by roughly 10 percent after 2010. The consequences of letting these tax cuts expire (as measured both in terms of tax revenue and in terms of economic efficiency) is the focus of the next section. The difference between the projected 2011 rate schedule and the schedule for 2003-2010 is the percentage point change in the tax rate for each group of taxpayers. More specifically, this is the change in statutory MTRs, Because I am looking at the effect of allowing the individual rates to rise whUe maintaining other features of the tax system, I assume that this also represents the projected change in the efJective marginal tax rate. However, the EMTR--a.s noted earlier, the share of an additional dollar of income that is paid to the government-is often somewhat different from the statutory MTR because the EMTR takes into account phase-ins, phaseouts, and other interactions with the IRS code. These other factors affect the actual share of income that the government receives.
Consider the personal exemption phaseout (PEP), which requires taxpayers to reduce their personal exemption by 3 percent for each dollar that their income ",,,ceeds the phaseout floor (until the personal exemption is reduced to zero). Thus, taxable income increases by $103 for every additional CBO (2005) , when all the intricacies of the tax code are taken into account, the range of EMTRs for the individual inCDme tax L' i from -1.6 percent (lor those often not paying income tax, but sometimes receiving refundable tax credits such as the Earned Income Tax Credit) to almost 35 percent (for the top two statutory tax brackets). These fmdings arc presented in table 5-2. Table 5 -2 also shows what happens when payroll and state taxes are included. 'vVhile the individual income tax hits upper-income groups the hardest (at the margin), federal payroll taxes (used to finance Social Security and Medicare) hit lower-inCDme groups the hardest. EMTRs for state taxes arc greatest for middle-income groups. When these three taxes are combined, EMTRs range from just over 30 per-cent for the 10 percent bracket to over 41 percent for the 33 percent. bracket.21 \'Ilhile these EMTRs account for the intricacies of the tax system, t.hey are based on standard convention, which assumes that marginal income is earned income. (I exclude filers whose top MTR is from capital gains.) However, marginal rates could differ from imputed EMTRs, if behavior at the margin includes changes to fringe benefit.s, perquisites, itemized deductions or business income. For example, wit.h respect to earned income, payroll taxes are likely relevant at the margin, but payroll taxes would not be relevant for responses to itemized deductions or many (but not all) fringe benefits. If a portion of behavioral responses includes some of In addition to the information on EMTRs by tax bracket, two other pieces of information are crucial for employing the formulae (laid out earlier) that estimate the revenue and efficiency implications of allowing the indi\~dual tax Tates to expire. We need to know both the En and the corresponding information on the amount of taxable income that is reported in each of the individual income tax brackets. The income information is published by the lRS and is summarized in table 5_3 22 Table 5-3 shows nearly $4.6 trillion in (modified) taxable income and nearly $900 billion in total tax revenue for 2005. These numbers are somewhat smaller than the actual totals for 2005 because they exclude flIers whose top MTR is for income from capital gains. 23 The final piece of information, the ETr, is the trickiest. As discussed above, the empirical literature on the ETI suggests a wide range of plausible estimates, and considerable disagreement surrounds tbe size of this parameter. Thns the next section shows how the e"--piring cuts in individual MTRs might aflect revenue and efficiency under a range of different ETIs. This approach aims to show what implicit views of the ETI may underlie different vie\V'S on tax policy-especially views on the relationship between ratc changes and revenues. Additionally, it highlights the sensitivity of revenue estimates to a range of ET1 assumptions. &fore proceeding. some caveats are in order. The results that follow are not from a 1i.lJ1 microsimulati.on model with behavioral resp.onses made at the indhiduallevel. There are a number of reasons why results fmm such an exercise might differ from those presented in the next secti.on. First, EMTRs differ within a statutory tax bracket, while here the average EMIR is applied to aggregated taxable income for each of the respective tax brackets. Second, some individuals are elose to the bottom 01 their tax bracket, which would likely censor behavioral =-ponses to a rise in the bracketS tax rate. Saez (2002) finds that while taxpayers by and large do not bunch at the kinks, there are still some who are near kink points. Because [ am not using individual-level data, I do not censor responses. Third. income measures are taken fi'om table 3.4 of IRS (2007), which groups filers by their top MTR I exclude taxpayers whose top tax ratc is for capital gains income. Some taxpayers, however. have capital gains income that is taxed at a rate lower than their top rate. This income may be included in my measure. Finally, 1apply EMTRs for labor (that is, earned) income when estimating behavioral responses. The EMTR may be the best choice here, but it is imprecise. Some income, at the margin, may result from realizing capital gains; other income, at the margin, may be business income that is exempt from payroll taxes. Even if responses represent cbanges to earned income, EMTRs can vary depending on which member of the tax npit is reporting the additional income. Moreover, responses may reflect changes to itemized deductions, in which case the ElvITR should exclude payroll taxes. The decision to use EMTRs for earned income may disproport.ionately bias responses for top tax bracket', since a larger share of this groups income comes from sources other than labor. However, the EMTR from the payroll tax is just 2.5 percent for high-income groups, whereas it exceeds 12.5 percent for the bottom two brackets. The choice of which ElvITR to use is problematic even when using individual-level panel data.
Despite these caveats, this is a useful exercise that illustrates the range of revenue responses and efficiency consequences resulting from the expiration of the Bush tax cuts. It also shows that these questions can be broached even by those who do not have access to confidential tax returns--in other words, the vast majority of scholars.
Revenue and Efficiency Implications of Expiring Tax Legislation
The mechanical change in revenues from allowing the individual rates to expire-that is, the change in individual income tax revenues assuming no behavioral responses-is estimated here at $98.6 billion 24 That is 13 percent greater than actual 2005 revenues 25 For the mechanical calculation, only revenues from the individual income tax change, since the mechanical calculat.ion ignores taxable income responses to the change in rates. Behavioral responses. though, lower revenues hUill the individual income tax and from payroll and state taxes (which further offsets revenue inneases from the individual income tax), since these bases overlap. About 38 percent of the mechanical revenue increase results from changing the 10 percent tax bracket back to 15 percent. This has the biggest effect both because the rate on this bracket is scheduled to undergo the largest percentage point increase, and because the increase in rates increases revenues not just from those facing this marginal rate, but also from filers in ill the higher brackets (who pay this rate on some of their income). The 35 percent rate bracket, which is slated to rise to 39.6, is the second most important in terms of the expw:ed mechanical increase in revenues. This bracket accounts for nearly 23 percent (or $26 billion) of the expected increase in revenues. In contrast to what occurs when the 10 percent bracket is raised, here, all the additional revenue is from mers in this marginal rate bracket. Although less than 1 percent of filers face this top bracket, tllis group reported over half of one trillion dollars in 2005 taxable income (IRS 2007) .
Projecting tax revenues under a range of ETl estimates shows the extent to which beha,ioral responses might reduce the mechanical gain in tax revenues. Recall that this difference between the mechanical and actual r.hange in revenues is also equal to the efficiency cost (or deadweight loss) resulting from the tax increase. As figure 5-1, llgure 5-2, and table 5-5 show, a modest ETI of 0.2 would lower the gain in federal income tax revenues by more than 12 percent (or $12.2 billion, from $98.6 billion to $86.5 billion) compared to the mechanical gain. (When payroll and state taxes are accounted for, the revenue olIset and total D\NL rise nearly 28 percent, to $15.6 billion.) A large HI of 1.0 would wipe away 62 percent (or $60.9 billion) of the revenue gain, and an additioual 17 percent (or $17 billion) would be lost from payroll and state revenues. Revenues from filers in the 15 percent bracket rise by $21.9 billion under each scenario, even though their MTR is not scheduled to change when the cuts expire 26 Members of this group pay more in taxes because their taxable income that was below the 15 percent rate was taxed at 10 percent, but would be taxed at 15 percent. It is assumed that there are no income effects and thus that this group does not change its beha,ior. At an ETI of O.5-halfway between the extremes already discussed-the increase in federal revenues from the tax increase is 45 percent (or $30.5 billion) smaller than under the mechanical case, and an additional 28 percent (or $8.5 billion) would be lost from payroll and state revenues. As shmvn in table 5-5, the one-year revenue gain in federal income taxes from the expiration of the cuts in individual tax rates would equal $98.6 billion "'"th no beha\10ral response; $86.5 billion when assuming an ETI of 0.2; and $37.8 billion when assuming an ETI of l.
In each case, 36 percent of the reduction in federal income tax revenues (compared to the mechanical case) results from behavioral resp0rL"es hy those 0.7 percent of filers in the top income tax bracket. Forty-four percent +09 -6,801 -8,531 -10,23+ -13,639 -17,032 Source: Author's calculations. of the reduction in federal income tax revenues is attributable to the 1.8 percent of filers in the top two tax brackets. If the ETl increases with income, as the empirical literature suggests, these shares would be even larger. Some have suggested returning rates to their 2001 levels for just the top two tax brackets. At an ETI of 0.5, this would imply just $15.4 billion more in annual ,",venues ([TOm the federal income tax) and $19.9 billion in increased OWL. At. an ETl of 0.2, federal income t.<L' < revenues would be expected t.o increase by $25.7 billion, wit.h $8 billion in additional OWL. At. an ETI of 1, the tax increase would move the top t.wo tax brackets past. their Laffer (or revenue-maximizing) rat.e. Thus this would act.ually lead to a reduct.ion in overall revenues and an increase in DWL.
NOTES: Dollar values~in ltlillions

l26 TAX: POLlCY LESSONS FROM THE 2000s
Marginal Deadweight Loss. The changes in revenues and in DWl.. from changes in tax policy can be combined into a measure that captures the increase in DWL associated ",th a one-dollar increase in revenues (or, for a tax cut, the reduction in DWL associated ",th a one-dollar reduction in revenues). This measure of marginal DWL simply equals the change in revenues divided by the change in DWL. As tables 5-6a and 5-6b show, ranges in ETI of 0.2 to 1 imply a tremendous range in the efficiency costs associated with raising additional revenue (by allowing MIRs to return to their 2001 levels). At an Ell of 0.2, for example, allowing the tax ruts to expire would result in a marginal DW1.. (per dollar of federal income tax revenue) of SO.1&-that is, for each additional dollar the federal government receives in revenue, society would be worse off by SO.I8. At an Ell of 1, the marginal DWL rises to S2.06 per additional dollar of income tax revenue raised. At an Ell of 0.5, this number is S0.57. When revenue offsets to the other tax bases are accounted for, the marginal DWL rises by just 4 percent at an Ell of 0.2, but by 82 percent at an Ell of 1.0.
For comparison, consider the use in Feldstein (1999) of an individuallevel microsimulation model to assess the possible implications of a 10 percent increase in marginal tax rates. Feldstein concludes that, assuming an Ell of 1.04, behavioral responses would erase over two-thirds of the mechanical gain in tax revenues and that the marginal DWL would be over $2 per every additional dollar of revenue. Using more recent data and assuming an Ell of 0.4, Feldstein (2008) reports a marginal DWL of $0.76 per additional dollar of revenue raised. At an EIl of 0.4, my estimated DWL is smaller, at $0.42 per dollar of federal income tax revenue, but it rises to SO.62 when I account for revenue offsets to the paYTOIl tax and to the states. Note that Feldstein is considering a case where rates for each bracket increase by the same percentage. The case examined here is different, since brackets change by different percentages and one group (those currently in the 15 percent bracket) experiences no change in its MTR For a given Ell, the effiCiency implications of raising tax rates vary greatly across the brackets. Those in the 15 percent tax bracket drive down the overall D\VL per dollar measure because this group is assumed to have no behavioral response (since its MTR does not change); but it does pay more in taxes because the 10 percent bracket rises to 15 percent. Raising the bottom (10 percent) tax bracket has only minor efficiency implications. The marginal DWL per dollar of revenue ranges from $0.01 at an ETI of 0.2 to $0.07 at an ETI of 1. This is partly because those in the lower tax brackets face a lower EMIR than those in the higher brackets and because the DvVL increases by the square of the EMTR Another reason for the low efficiency costs is that much of the additional revenue comes from those in higher taX brackets, who have income taxed in tltis bracket as welL Since the marginal income for these higher-income groups is in another tax bracket, their behavior is not affeered by the rate changes (in lower brackets).27 For those in the 25 to 35 percent brackets, the marginal DWl-measures are much larger. In a case where the tax cuts expire for only the top two brackets and we assume an ETI of 0.5, the result is a marginal DWL of $1.30 per dollar of revenue. However, at an ETI of 0.2, the marginal DWL is over 75 percent smaller. The marginal DWL per additional dollar of revenue is greatest for the 25 and 28 percent brackets. Raising rates on tltis group results in beha\~oral responses that lower revenues, wbile the "w~ndfall" revenue from those in higher brackets (that is not assoc:illted with any additional D\VL) is small because there are so few filers in the top two brackets.
Laffer Curves. It is widely accepted that behavioral responses to taxation (as measured by the FTI) act to offset revenue gains from an increase in tax rates and revenue losses from a decrease in rates. The degree to which this occurs, however, is a hotly contested issue. If higher tax rates cause less income to be reported, the result can be a net reduction in revenues. At one extreme, the government will receive no tax revenue at a 0 percent tax rate. At a taX rate of 100 percent, the government may also receive no (or at least very little) revenue. Thus, the revenue-maximizing, or Laffer, rate must be somewhere between 0 and 100. ""''bile the Laffer rate "optimizes" revenue coUection (given other institutions in the economy), it should not be confused with an optimal tax rate, which economists use to describe the rate that raises a given amount of revenue with the fewest distortions t.o the economy.
The curve which shows the relationship between tax revenue and tax rates has borne the eponym "LaUer" for thirty years. The idea is much older, however. It was formally presented by French engineer and economistjules DupUit in the 1840s; and as early as the fourteenth century, the polymath Ibn Khaldun \','fote: "At the beginning of the dynasty, taxation y~elds a large revenue from small assessments. At the end of the dynasty, taxation y~elds a small revenue from large assessments."28 ets because much of the revenue raised from these rates comes from filers in higher brackets. Laffer rates for the npper-income brackets are much lower and are quite sensitive to the ETI. At an ETI of 0.2, the revenuemaximizing rate from the top bracket is 77.5 percent-well above the current EMTR of 40.7 percent. At an ETI of I, the picture is quite different, with the Laffer rate just slightly above the current EMTR. Note that these are the Laffer rates that would maximize combined tax revenue from the federal income tax, state income taxes, and federal payroll taxes. The rates thilt would maximize federal income tax revenue alone would be higher than those reported in table 5-7. This is especially tme under the higher £1'] assumptions, where offsetting revenues from an increase in federal rates can be substantial Figure 5 -3 plots the full Laffer curves for the top tax bracket under each of the ETI assumptions. The curves are generated under the assumption that the ET] is constant across all tax rates (on a given curve). ]n reality, little can be known about the ETI at rates far from those seen in the data. ]n any event, the curves illustrate the dramatic difference in the relationship between tax rates and tax revenUes across a range ofET15 present in the literature. For comparison, the diagonal line shows the relationship with no behavioral responses-implying that tax revenue increases linearly with tax rates, and no Laffer point is ever reached.
Conclusion
This chapter reviews recent literature on the ETI, highlighting important theoretical and empirical findings. In tenus of theory, the ETI has been shown to he one of the central parameters for measuring the efficiency costs of the tax system and for measuring the revenue implications of tax changes. That said, recent research highlights instances when the ETl accurately captures the efficiency implications from a tax change and when the parameter may overstate or understate these consequences. Other research has shown that the ETI is not a structural parameter, but rather a function of institutional features that policymakers may have under their control. On the empirical side, recent research suggests that the ETl is substantially smaller than early estimates of it by Feldstein (1995a) and lindsey (1987) and that the ETl increases with income. Recent research also finds ETI estimates to be quite sensitive to an array of factors, and the range of plausible estimates is therefore broad. Based on 2005 data, ] estimate that returning individual income tax rates to their 2001 levels would raise revenues by $98.6 billion dollars, assuming no behavioral responses. At an ETI of 0.2, $12.2 billion (or 12 percent) of this mechanical increase in federal income ta.x revenue would be lost due to reductions in taxable income. Another $3.4 billion in revenue would be lost from payroll and state taxes. At an ET] of 0.8, $48.8 billion (or 49 percent) of the mechanical revenue gain would be lost. Another $13.6 billion in revenue would be lost from payroll and state taxes. The DWL per doHar of additional revenue from the federal income tax is also highly sensitive to the ET]; it ranges from $0.18 at an ETl of 0.2 to $1.25 at an ETl of 0.8.
Laffer rates for each tax bracket and Laffer curves for the top tax bracket are sensitive to the range of ET] estimates found in the literature. An ETl of 0.2 implies a Laffer tax rate for the top tax bracket of 78 percent. On the other hand, at an ETI of I, the estimated Laffer rate is just 41 percent, or slightly higher than the current effective marginal tax rate for this group. Notes L Specifically, the ETI equals the percentage change in reported taxable income associated \'vith a 1 percent increase in the net-of-tax rate, where the net-of-tax rate equals the share of the next dollar of reported taxable income that is not taxed, or 1 minus the marginal tax rate, 2, The survey did include questions on labor supply elasticities and ruu:rower questions regarding behavioral responses to ta:xation.
3, Most tax legislation, and especially the Bush tax cuts, encompass more than simple changes to the rate struc.ture. Some opposition, or support, for (ax measures may be due to those other factors, and not necessarily to the changes to marginal tax rates.
4. \:Vhile the estimate is toward the high end of the current literature, it was tess so at the time Feldstein was writing. 5. Specifican)~it is the compensated elasticity (or the substitution component of the overall elasticity) that is important for measuting efficiency. Compensated elasticities measure the portion of the overall response attributable to changes in relative prices (as opposed to the portion of the response due to changes in income), It is the distortion in relative prices that leads to losses in efficiency 6, An NBER working paper version of the 1999 article was released several years earlier, in 1995. This earlier version influenced researchers prior to the publication of the 1999 version and contains different pOliLy~imulations than the later \'erslOn. 7. There are exceptions when a..:;se..<;sing effici.ency and revenue implications from a tax change that is complex. For example, suppose tax rates rise and, in response, taxable income falls, but a portion of that drop in taxable income is due to increased charitable contributions (and suppose those charities produce positive externalities). Or, suppose that a tax inlTease is used to finance an underprovided public good, In instances such as those, where external costs or benefits are present, assessing efficiency implications is more complex. 8, However, Harberger does separately examine the effects of taxing savings, 9, This is not a revenue projection for 2011, but rather applies projected 2011 rates to 2005 elata, A projection for 2011 would account for e"l'ected income growth through 2011, as well as other factors that would affect revenues.
10. \tVhen offsets to revenue fmm payroll and state taxes are taken into account, the range is from $0,19 to $1,72, 1L However, Hall and Liebman (2000) suggest that the large transitory response observed by Goolsbee (2000) could re[ect u1e exercising of past stock options and stock appreciation rather than a response to changing tax rates. ]2, Folloy"ing Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), I use "avoidance" to tneml avoiding the tax, but not avoiding the activity. For example, choosing letsure is one way to avoid paying income tax, but that decision falls under real substitution and. not avoidance, because the consumption bundle has changed as a re,,-ult of the tax,
